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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALLY'S ,,~AGON, INC. 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
STATE TAX CO~U.lISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
11155 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a proceeding to review a determination of 
the Utah State Tax Commission made against the plain-
tiff. Following an audit and examination report dated 
.June 15, 1966 (R.113-117), the Utah State Tax Commis-
sion through its auditing division determined that during 
the period May, 1964, through March, 1966, the plaintiff 
was subject to the applicable state and local sales taxes. 
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DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION 
Both an informal and formal hearing were held· 
before the Utah ~:Hate Tax Commission, and in Novem-
ber, 1967, the commission issued its decision No. 260 
determining that the plaintiff was subject to the taxes 
as alleged. This decision 'Was subsequently amended on 
December 28, 1967; however, no change was made in the 
ultimate determination of liability by the commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
rrhe plaintiff seeks to have the determination of the 
Utah State Tax Commission that it was subject to the 
state and local sales taxes for the period involved re-
versed. The defendant seeks to have the decision upheld. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant accepts generally the plaintiff's state-
ment of facts; however, a few additional matters might 
be mentioned. The plaintiff makes reference to a 
general statement of the plaintiff's which was read into 
the record (R. 60-62) and rather intimates that the 
defendant accepts these facts more or less as a stipulation 
since no objeetion was raised to its being read into the 
record. This statement was presented only in the interest 
of saving time and as a condensed reprnsentation of 
plaintiff's interpretation of the matters contained there-
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in. At no time did the defendant stipulate that it would 
accept all of the matters contained in the statement as 
binding on it. 
Contrary to the contention of the plaintiff, it is 
believed that all regulations and rulings in the possession 
of the defendant were continuously made available to it 
and, if they were not furnished, would have been fur-
nished had they been requested. With respect to the 
advertisement seeking boys to operate the ice cream 
vehicles, there is some confusion and question that he 
advertised for independent contractors since he indicated 
that his ad was placed under a eiolumn of either salesmen 
or help wanted. (R.77) ·while it appears that the plaintiff 
did not advertise by conventional media such as news-
paper ads, billboards or radio, the use of motor vehicles 
having musical devices and bearing signs prominently 
displaying the name of plaintiff constituted a form of 
advertisement. And, this advertisement brought attention 
only to the plaintiff. (R.75) There was nothing to indi-
cate a separateness between the plaintiff and the oper-
ator of the vehicle, and it was the distinct intention to 
have identity of the vehicle and operator related solely 
to the plaintiff. 
Finally, while the plaintiff did not solicit retail sales 
through the conventional means mentioned above, it did 
solicit retail sales by having its trucks traverse the 
streets of the county playing music and offering sale of 
its confections to county residents. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
SINCE IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE RE-
QUIREMENTS OF TT-IE STATUTE ESTABLISHING 
THE RIGHT ri:io APPEAL. 
The defendant would greatly like to bring this 
matter back to the attention of the court, at least briefly, 
realizing that memoranda have been filed previously 
and that oral arguments have been held. Since, however, 
the court did not enter a written decision setting forth 
the ha.sis on which the writ of certiorari was allowed, 
although the statutory requirements had not been com-
plied with, the defendant feels that it and the taxpaying 
public should be advised of the basis of the court's 
determination. This is necessary to insure uniform en-
forcement of the law as to all taxpayers and to enable 
the administrative body to seek such legislative relief as 
it deems necessary if it is the opinion of the court that 
the statute is for some reason unconstitutional. 
The applicable statutory provision is Repl. Viol. Utah 
Code Ann. §59-15-16 1963: 
Before making application to the Supreme 
Court for a writ, the full amown-t of the taxes, 
interest and other charges audited and stated in 
the determination or decision of the tax commis-
sion mitst bP deposited with the tax commission 
and an undertaking filed with the tax commission 
in such amount and with such surety as the tax 
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commission shall prove [sic] to the effect that if 
such writ is dismissed or the decision of the tax 
commission affirmed, the applicant for the writ 
will pay all costs and charges which may accrue 
against him in the prosecution of said case; or at 
the option of the applicant, such undertaking may 
be in a sum sufficient to cover the taxes, interest 
and other charges audited and stated in such de-
cision, plus the co·sts and charges which may 
accrue against him in the prosecution of such 
case, in which event, the applicant shall not be 
required to pay such taxes, interest and other 
charges as a condition precedent to his application 
for the writ. (Emphasis added.) 
There is no contention by either party that the plain-
tiff has complied with this provision. 
\Vithin the past few years this court in two cases 
has considered matters brought before it involving the 
Utah State Tax Commission wherein appeal was sought 
to be taken without the party availing itself of the exclu-
sive means of review provided by the sales tax statute. 
In Pacific Intennountain Express Co. v. State Tax 
Comni'n, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957) the taxpayer 
sought to appeal from the district court to the Utah 
Supreme Court. Sales tax had been as,sessed against the 
taxpayer which taxpayer felt was unlawful and sought 
to have it declared so in the lower ciourt. In a unanimous 
decision, after considering several cases and the statutory 
provision involved, this court held: 
It is our conclusion that the trial court cor-
rectly dismissed the action for the reason ~hat t~e 
procedure set forth in the Sales Tax Act itself is 
5 
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the exclusive method of seeking redress from the 
sales tax assessment. This obviates our considera-
tion of the validity of the tax 7 Utah 2d 15 20 . ' ' 316, P.2d 549, 552. 
Then, in 1964, the court issued its decision in 
Lambert v. State Tax Conim'n, 16 Utah 2d 159, 397 P.2d 
294. There, the taxpayer sought to compel in the district 
court action by a representative of the Utah State Tax 
Commission. The district court granted the taxpayer the 
relief sought. On appeal by the Utah State Tax Com-
mission this court again unanimously held that the de-
cision must be reversed since the taxpayer did not comply 
with the exclusive requirements of the use tax act. The 
court stated: 
·whether Mr. Lambert's remedy under Chapter 
16, U.C.A.1953, known as the Use Tax Act was ex-
clusively to exhaust his administrative remedies 
and seek review of the Commission's decision in 
this court or whether the remedies provided under 
the provisions of Sec. 59-16-23 of that Act are 
available to him need not be determined in the 
instant case. Under all the provisions of the Use 
Tax Act before recourse can be had to either this 
court or the district court for relief from a use 
tax assessment there must either be deposited with 
the Commission the amount assessed or payment 
made under protest. Here it is clear this action 
was brought to avoid these conditions precedent 
to recourse to the courts. The court therefore 
erred in ordering the issuance of license plates 
and registration of the vehicle involved. 
This court has held, therefore, that where the Legis-
lature has established exclusive means of review of the 
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determinations and deC'isions made by the Utah State 
Tax Commission sud1 means of review must be followed. 
The defendant would agree that arbitrary or capricious 
adion by it may obviate the necessity of following these 
statutorily established means of review, but there has 
been no showing here of sud1 arbitrariness or capricious-
ness. (R. 131-146) 
It would appear, then, that under the statute and 
the decisions of this court, plaintiff is not entitled to 
prosecute this appeal until it has 0omplied with the con-
ditions precedent set forth in the statute. Because of the 
statute and past court decisions, the defendant feels 
compelled to ask the court to reconsider its determination 
in which it permitted this appeal or, at least, to advise 
it and the public generally in a written decision the basis 
on which it determined that a taxpayer can appeal a 
determination of the Utah State Tax Commission without 
complying with the conditions preC'edent of the statute. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF IS A RETAILER REQUIRED TO 
COLLECT AND PAY OVER TO THE STATE ALL 
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES IMPOSED BY LA"\V 
UPON RETAIL SALES. 
Repl. Vol. U tab Code Ann. § 39-15-5 ( 1963) requires 
the collection of a sales tax by the vendor on every retail 
sale, and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4 (1963) 
establishes the rate of the tax imposed. Contrary to the 
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contention of the plaintiff that the operators of the ice 
cream vehicles were independent contractors, the defen-
dant determined that said individuals were either agents 
or employees of the plaintiff; that the retail sales were 
made by the plaintiff; and, that the plaintiff was required 
to collect and pay over the applicable tax. 
This court in several cases has been required to 
determine the nature of the relationship between in-
dividuals; i.e., principal-agent, employer-employee, mas-
ter-servant, or independent contractor. Though none of 
these cases seem to have been concerned with an indi-
vidual's liability for sales tax, these ca.ses, nevertheless, 
seem to be so similar as to be controlling in this i·ssue. 
In Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 451, 
196 P. 2d 502 (1948), the court reviewed the case authori-
ties and considered, particularly, the tests which have 
been set forth in the Restatement, Agency, sec. 220, which 
provides: 
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform 
service for another in his affairs and who, with 
respect to the physical conduct in the perform-
ance of the service, is subject to the other's 
control or right to control. 
(2) In determining whether one acting for an-
other is a servant or an independent contractor, 
the following matters of fact, among others, are 
oonsidered: 
a. The extent of control which, by the agree-
ment, the master may exercise over the details 
of the work; 
8 
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. b. wl:et_her or not. the employee is engaged 
m a d1stmct occupation or business· 
' 
c. the kind of occupation, with reference fo 
whether in the locality, the work is usually done 
und~r ~he ~irection of the employer or by a 
specialist without supervision; 
d. the skill reqnired in the particular occu-
pation; 
e. whether the employer ·Or the workman 
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the 
place of work for the person doing the work; 
f. the length of time for which the person is 
employed; 
g. the method of payment, whether by the 
time or by the job; 
h. whether or not the ·work is a part of the 
regular business of the employer; 
i. whether or not the parties believe they 
are creating the relationship of master and 
servant; and 
j. whether the principal is or is not engaged 
in business. 
Under the Restatement and the Utah case law, the 
important criterion for determining whether there i·s a 
relationship of master and servant is whether there is 
a right to control the manner in which the work is ac-
complished, whether or not such control is exerdsed. 
Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 393 
P. 2d 391 (1964); Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 
14 Utah 2d 3, 376 P. 2d 386 (1962); Stover Bedding Co·. v. 
9 
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Industrial Cornmission, 99 Utah 423, 107 P. 2d 1027 
(1940). 
In the instant case it would appear that the taxpayer 
had the right to control the activities of the drivers and 
that he did exercise such rights. The plaintiff was re-
sponsible fo1 the care and maintenance of the motor 
vehicles; the plaintiff established areas in which the 
drivers were to operate; the plaintiff regulated the hours 
during which they were to "·ork and could determine 
which of the drivers would work on any particular occa-
sion; the plaintiff furnished ihe goods to be sold and 
restricted the drivers to the sale of his products only, set 
the price of these products and determined the commis-
sion to be paid each of the drivers. The employment was 
terminable at will by the plaintiff and the plaintiff, in 
reality, did not sell merchandise to the drivers each day 
but provided them with the merchandise and paid them 
a portion of the gross receipts on the Tuesday following 
the end of the weekly period. 
These factors strongly indicate that the drive:r:s were 
not independent contractors but were employees of the 
plaintiff. 
It is noted that the agreement is entitled as one for 
the lease of the motor vehicle ancl it is specifically pro-
vided that the drivers are independent contractors. \:Vhile 
effect is normally given to the designation of the cion-
tracting parties, a legal relationship of independent 
contractor does not arise simply by calling it such and if 
10 
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the factors indicate that another telationship exists, the 
agreement will be treated as such. 
·where parties in good faith contract as to a 
status and the understanding arrived at is niot 
contrary to the law as it is then announced, the 
intent of the parties as set forth in such a contract 
can be considered as an element in determining 
the relationship of the parties and can be given 
weight by the Commission and this court. Such a 
provision in a contra~t has the effect of negating 
an intent on the part of the master to retain con-
trol and an intent on the part of the agent to yield 
contr.ol. However, the weight to be given this fac-
tor may be inconsequential if the other terms of 
the contract are such that by peering through •the 
mask of contract phraseology it can be reasonably 
determined the contract was merely a guise to 
conceal the true relationship. Christean v. Indus-
trial Commission, supra. · 
We must look to the substance rather than the 
form of a transaction, and the categorization 
given to a relationship by the interested parties is 
not conclusive of the nature of the relationship. 
There, an agreement between the taxicab company 
and the drivers specifically provided that no 
employer-employee relationship existed between 
the parties. In holding that the cab company was 
liable for contributions under the Unemployment 
Compensation Act, we stated that despite the 
negation of an employer-employee relati1onship in 
the agreement there was sufficient exercise of 
control over the drivers to justify a finding of 
employment status under the Employment Com-
" . pensation Act. True, "employment was speci-
fically defined in that act, but the ultimate 
determination came from the totality of the cir-
11 
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cumstances surrounding the transactions. Abt v. 
Dept. of Revenue, 34 Ill. 2d 324, 215 N. E. 2d 243 
(1966). 
See also Cassidy v. Peters, 50 Wash. 2d 115, 309 P. 
2d 767 ( 1957). There have been several recent cases 
similar to the instant case in which ice cream was 
vended by means of motorized drivers. In Abt v. Dept. 
of Revenu.e, supra, the court pointed particularly to the 
facts that the taxpayer owned the vehicles used, that he 
supplied the gas and obtained the licenses and registra-
tion for the vehicles, that the vehicles were stored at bis 
place of business, that the drivers were paid a commis-
sion on the amount sold and that he as.signed the drivers 
to designated territories. The court held that this con-
stituted a relationship of employer-employee and that the 
taxpayer rather than the drivers was subject to the 
Illinois sales tax. 
In Ogozalek v. Adminstrator, Unemployment Com-
pensation Act, 28 Conn. Sup. 100, 163 Atl. 2d 114 (1960), 
the court again held that the drivers of ice cream vending 
trucks were employees. There the employer owned five 
trucks with his name printed on each, and the price of 
the ice cream was listed on each of the trucks. The em-
ployer repaired, serviced and maintained the trucks, 
obtained insurance and licenses for them, and paid for all 
gas and oil used. The drivers ·were furnished with a 
uniform and furnished with cash each day for the purpose 
of making change. The employer assigned each of the 
drivers to a specific territory and paid them their portion 
of the proceeds at the end of each week. These factors 
12 
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were held to evidence sufficient control to create a rela-
tionship of empl•oyer-employee. 
Also, in Cassidy v. Peters, supra, the ice cream 
vendors were considered to be employees. The operative 
fads were similar to those in the above cited cases and 
in the instant case. 
POINT III 
~EITHER THE UTAII STATE SALES TAX ACT 
NOR THE REGULATORY PROVISIONS PROMUL-
GATED THEREUNDER PROHIBIT COLLECTION 
BY THE PLAINTIFF ON THE APPLICABLE 
STATE AND LOCAL SALES TAX. 
In order to facilitate the collection of state and local 
sale's tax by vendors, the Utah State Tax Commission 
enacted regulation S6 which established a bracket system 
of oollection. In other words, sales between certain 
amounts were deemed to require a tax of a certain 
amount, and the scale was graduated as to the amount of 
sales. This bracket system imposed no tax on sales which 
were between the amounts 10f zero to fourteen cents. Ap-
parently, the taxpayer is contending that since its sales 
were less than fifteen cents in each instance it was not 
required to collect the sales tax because of thi,s bracket 
system. The defendant feels that this contention has been 
adequately resolved in a decision of thi,s court, Hinckley, 
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 70, 404 P. 2d 622 
( 1965). This court there considered several aspects of 
13 
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the sales tax provisions, its imp()sition, and duty of col-
lection. With respect to the duty of the vendor to collect 
the tax, the court stated: 
. : . . The legislature by eliminating the pro-
v1s10n that the vendor had the option of collecting 
from the vendee or abs()rbing the tax himself if 
lie saw fit, did not change the nature of the t~x 
which is still one imposed on the transaction. It i~ 
still mandatory for the vendor to assume the re-
sponsibility for the collection, accounting and 
remitting of the amounts due the State on the 
transactions. 
A·s to the nature of the tax, the court made relation 
to its decision in W. F. Jens en Candy Co. v. State Tax 
Cornm'n, 90 Utah 359, 61 P. 2d 629, 107 A.L.R. 261 
(1936): 
... this court pointed out that the tax imposed 
is a tax on a transaction, and unless there is an 
exemption there is still due the State the rate 
imposed on such transaction whether it be a cent 
or one-fifth of a cent. The fact that in sales of less 
than 50 cents the collection of the tax may be dif-
ficult does not change the responsibility of the 
vendor for the collection and accounting to the 
State for the tax imposed. 
Then, the court further stated: 
The tax imposed is upon the transaction, and its 
payment to the State is not dependent upon how 
it is collected. The rate is constant and applies 
alike to every seller. The ,seller is required to remit 
the amount due on total sales. If he chooses to sell 
items which are priced at a point on the schedule 
where less than the full tax can be collected, be 
14 
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cannot complain that the :,;cherlule is discrimina-
tory as to him because no provision has been made 
hy the Tax Commission whereby the correct 
amount due from the purchaser under his method 
of doing business can he collected. The schedule 
applies alike to every seller and aids those whose 
method of doing hus;ncss makes its application 
practical by facilitating the collection of the cor-
rect amount required by the seller to be remitted 
to the State 011 its local sales. 
As to the fact that the sales made by Hinckley were 
generally less than the minimum amount set forth in the 
bracket system, the court made this observation: 
That Hinckley has chosen a method of doing 
business through vending machines which makes 
it impossible for it to collect the tax under the 
"bracket system" does not deprive it of equal 
protection of the laws nor is it deprived of its 
prnperty ~without due process. The tax imposed is 
upon the transaction, and its payment to the State 
is not dependent upon whether it is collected or 
whether the consumer pays it. The rate remains 
constant and applies alike to every vendor. Be-
cause a vendor chooses to sell only articles at a 
price on which no tax can be collected under the 
"bracket system" does not make the system dis-
criminatory nor arbitrary. It may be that the 
''bracket system'' should not apply to such a 
vendor if he can devise a rneans of collecting the 
correct amount of the tax, but that does not mean 
that if he cannot devise such a means that as tio 
him the tax is unlawful. 
And, then: 
Our attention has not been called to any pro-
vision of our Sales Tax Act which forbids the 
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collcctiou of the correct amount due from a pur-
chaser regardless of the fact that the considera-
tion is so small that there is no coin of the realm 
that can be used. Nor has our attention been ealleu 
to any provision of our Sales Tax Act which 
makes it unlawful or prohibits a vendor from 
absorbing or paying the tax himself, if he so 
chooses. It does not necessarily follow from the 
fact that the 1937 amendment deleted the provi-
s10n that the vendor had the option of collecting 
from the vendee or absorbing the tax himself that 
the legislature intended to prohibit or make it 
unlawful for a vendor to abs,orb or pay the tax 
himself. The Aet still provides that the tax shall 
be collected and that the vendor is responsible for 
its collection and must remit the correct amount 
due from its total sales for the remitting period. 
-we cannot ascribe to the legi·slature an intent to 
make it impossible for a vendor to conform with 
its requirements. 
Finally, this court took specific note of the fact that 
the bracket system of collection was not the only method 
of collection of the tax imposed by the statute and could 
not be used exclusively by the administrativ.e agency. 
It follows from what we have said that as to 
busine.sses where all sales are for less than the 
amount in which the "bracket system" pr1ovid€s 
for collection of the tax from the vendee, the 
''bracket system'' provided by the Tax Commis-
sion docs not eonf orm to the Act which imposes 
the tax on the transaction and requires the vendor 
t;o collect the tax from the vendee. As to such 
businesses, the "bracket system," promulgated 
by the Tax Commission, of collectin~ the t~xes by 
the vendor need not be the only device which can 
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be used by a vendor. ... Such a regulation ob-
viously is not in harmony with the Act which 
requires the collertion of the tax, yet makes it 
impossible for a vendor to charge fractional parts 
of a cent for items sold; for instance 9 and 7 /10 
cents as consideration for the sale and 3/10 cent 
for sales tax, thereby making it possible, if he 
desires to use that device, to collect the tax from 
the vendee. After all, the ''bracket system'' is only 
a device which would make it pos·sible for vendors 
to collect approximately the correct amount of the 
tax which they are required to remit on their 
transactions. lVhere the "bracket system" device 
is impractical because it cannot serve such a 
purpose, a vendor should not be precluded from 
using some other means, since the clear intent of 
the law is the collection of approximately the 
correct amount from vendees and the remitta;nce 
by vendors of the tax due Mi total value of trans-
actions. 
The defendant contends that under this case and 
its underlying reasoning that the state and local sales 
tax must be imposed and that a regulatory bracket system 
is only directive and is set forth only for the assistance 
of the vendor. It does not relieve the retailer of his re-
sponsibility to collect the tax on each retail sale. The 
plaintiff, therefore, as a retailer wa.s required to collect 
the state and local sales taxes although he may have 
considered himself exempt under the bracket system. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant contends first that this court should 
not entertain this appeal smce the plaintiff failed to 
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oomply with the conditions precedent clearly set forth 
in the ·sales tax ·statute, which provisions this court has 
heretofore upheld. Additionally, the arrangement be. 
tween the plaintiff and the operators of the motor 
vehicles was clearly not one of an independent contractor, 
but more closely it:sembling that of either a principal. 
agent or employer-employee. It seems inconceivable that 
these young boys could be treated as independent con-
tractors where the plaintiff exercised such a degree of 
control and supervision and where their concept of the 
relationship was Qnly that of selling ice cream. 
As the cases all indicate, the characterization ae-
corded to an agreement by the parties is not controlling 
and this would be particularly so where the contract 
itself was drafted by an individual dealing primarily with 
young men who have not even yet reached the age of 
majority. Finally, the contention that the plaintiff eiould 
not collect the sales tax because he is prohibited by 
statute is wholly untenable. This court in its own decision 
has demonstrated that it could collect the tax and there 
is no provision in either the statute or the regulation 
which would have prohibited the collection of the tax. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the decision of the Utah 
State Tax Commission should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Attorney General 
HENRY L. ADAMS, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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